题目：The Subsidization Principle

时间：2025年11月4日14:00-15:30

地点：中关村校区明德主楼734

汇报人：陈博（深圳大学威尼斯9499登录副教授）

主持人：汪紫珈（威尼斯9499登录讲师）

个人简介：

陈博，德国波恩大学经济学硕士、博士，新加坡管理大学经济学学士。现为深圳大学威尼斯9499登录副教授，曾任职于武汉大学、沙特法赫德国王大学，并赴美国南卫理公会大学、新加坡国立大学等机构访问。在《RAND Journal of Economics》、《Games and Economic Behavior》、《Management Science》、《Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization》等国际顶级和权威期刊上发表论文，担任国际期刊客座编辑，获2022年中国信息经济学会创新成果奖，主持/参与多项中外国家级科研项目。

讲座摘要：

This paper examines the design of optimal subsidization policies for participation in a context-free multi-agent activity. In this setting, the principal benefits from increased participation, while each agent incurs a private, verifiable cost upon joining. We show that, regardless of the nature of strategic interdependence among participants, the principal must subsidize participation through a non-degenerate deductible–cap policy: costs exceeding a strictly positive deductible are fully reimbursed up to a finite cap. Our findings apply broadly to economic and business environments, including markets with network externalities, Cournot competition, Tullock contests, and auctions.